Accounting practice,fiscal decentralization and corruption

In prior studies, accounting and decentralization corruption solutions have so far been analysed in isolation. In this article, we connect these two strands of literature on corruption. Understanding this connection is important because weak financial accounting and reporting systems can inhibit monitoring incentives and thus reduce decentralization benefits in countering corruption. We argue that the effectiveness of decentralization as an anti-corruption barrier is complemented by the quality of the accounting practice in a country. Using multiple sources of data, we find that decentralization has a positive and increasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with a high-quality accounting practice. In contrast, decentralization has a negative and decreasing effect on reducing corruption among countries with weak-quality accounting practices. These findings are robust to alternative measures of accounting, decentralization and corruption and to endogeneity tests. Our findings demonstrate the crucial information role of accounting in enhancing decentralization monitoring mechanisms and in thereby reducing corruption.     

Does corruption slow down innovation? Evidence from a cointegrated panel of U.S. states

I investigate the long-run relationship between corruption and innovative activity using annual data from 48 contiguous U.S. states between 1977 and 2006. Using U.S. data allows me to work with a panel long enough to exploit time series properties of the data. I use two different measures of innovative activity: one measuring the quantity and the other measuring the quality of the patents granted. I also use two different measures of corruption: one based on the number of corruption convictions, the other based on number of corruption stories covered in Associated Press news wires. Following Pedroni (1999, 2000), I estimate the cointegrating relationship between corruption and innovative activity with Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS). The results indicate that corruption indeed slows down innovation in the long-run.     

对我国风险投资组织模式选择的研究

有限合伙制以其特有的产权和责任安排而被认为是最符合风险投资行业特点和要求的组织形式。我国在对建立有限合伙制风险投资企业的认识上存在一定的分歧，本认为随着我国经济的不断向前发展，相关法律法规的完善，有限合伙制必然会成为我国风险投资企业组织模式的首选。     

A monetary business cycle model with unemployment

To reproduce key features of the post-war U.S. data, most monetary business cycle models must assume there are high price markups and that agents have high labour supply elasticities despite the existence of contradictory microeconomic evidence. This paper eliminates the need for these assumptions by introducing imperfectly observed effort into a limited participation model. The estimated model is better able to capture the sluggish price response to a monetary policy shock than the standard model, and is consistent with evidence regarding the qualitative responses of the U.S. economy to technology shocks, fiscal policy shocks and monetary policy shocks.     

董事责任制度重构： 精准问责、合理容错、宽容失败——以弘扬企业家精神为视角

基于权力（利）、义务、利益、责任与风险相匹配的基本逻辑,新《公司法》既要健全董监高的差异化公平问责规范体系,也要建立人性化合理减免责任制度。董监高问责能力取决于其职位的含权量、含金量、实际控制力与影响力,也取决于所在公司治理实况。要重点锁定并严惩关键少数者,严格区别独董与内部执行董事的法律角色。董监高责任应以过错责任为主、严格责任为例外。为精准识别董监高过错,建议采取法商、德商、智商、情商合一的理性人标准。要坚持责任自负为主、连带责任为辅。连带责任规范要保持统一化与谦抑化,赋予董监高在承担连带责任后的法定追偿权。要坚持有限责任为主、无限责任为辅。董监高对第三人不负责任为原则,负责为例外。建议精准甄别董监高个人责任与公司法人责任。章程或公司决议对法定代表人代表权的限制只要登记、备案或公示,即可对抗相对人。建议导入商事判断规则,允许公司自主豁免或减轻董监高责任,要求董监高自担最低责任限额,导入董监高责任保险制度。董监高问责机制要与股权激励相匹配。     

我国公司法定类型的反思及逻辑建构

自公司诞生以来,公司这一组织形式就受到各国商业实践和立法的特别重视。各国商事立法均对公司类型加以规定,并分门别类地对公司设立、股东权利、公司治理等进行相应规范。虽然商事逻辑的共通性拉近了各国立法上的公司类型,但各国在公司法定类型及相应公司规制上的差异仍旧鲜明。这也反映在我国学界对公司法定类型的争议上。我国公司法定类型改革应坚持本土商业实践逻辑,并确保改革成本最小化。由此,保留有限责任公司和股份有限公司,并按公司规模大小进一步区分出大型公司与小型公司,就成为理性选择的结果。具体而言,在有限责任公司中,增设大型公司,明确大型公司认定标准,并在公司机关设置、财务会计制度等方面给予相对严格的例外规定;在股份有限公司中,增设小型公司,对其赋予更加灵活、便捷的自治,并将上市公司扩增为公众公司。     

行政垄断、寻租与腐败——转型经济的腐败机理分析

本文试图利用寻租经济学的方法，对中国渐进转型过程中所产生的特有的腐败形式——行政垄断的本质、成因、形式、特征进行了分析；基于现有对转型经济中腐败现象的研究，提出了转型经济中腐败现象的新的分类；并对行政垄断，主要是行业垄断的经济损失规模及租金的耗散等问题进行了初步的研究；最后，回顾了中国反垄断改革的进展，并提出了进一步改革的议程。     

从经济理性到有限理性:经济学研究理性假设的演变

"经济理性"是经济学的传统研究假设,却因背离现实而受到质疑.基于行为人稀缺的心理资源和系统固有的不确定性而产生的"有限理性"正逐步取代"经济理性"成为经济学研究的理性假设.不同的理性观点可以从决策的视角得到系统地解释和比较.并且,随着理性假设的演变,经济行为的决策标准也相应从单一静态最优向多元动态平衡转变.     

Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign direct investment

This paper assesses the relationship between corruption and inward foreign direct investment (FDI). Previous research has presumed that corruption directly enters the cost function of multinationals, suggesting a negative relationship between corruption and FDI. For a sample of 73 developed and less developed countries and the time period 1995–1999, we find a clear positive relationship between corruption and FDI. Corruption is thus a stimulus for FDI.